Train Drivers' Ratings of Perceived Risk Associated with Illegal Motorist Behaviours at Level Crossings by Davey, Jeremy et al.
 1 
This is the author-manuscript version of this work - accessed from   
http://eprints.qut.edu.au 
 
Davey, Jeremy D. and Wallace, Angela M. and Stenson, Nicholas J and Freeman, 
James E. (2007) Train drivers' ratings of perceived risk associated with illegal 
behaviours at level-crossings. Journal of Occupational Health and Safety, Australia 
and New Zealand 23(5):pp. 445-450. 
 
Copyright 2007 CCH Australia Ltd 
 
Submission to The Journal of Occupational Health 
and Safety, Australia and New Zealand 
 
Manuscript Cover Page 
 
 
Title: Train drivers’ ratings of perceived risk associated with illegal 




Train drivers’ ratings of perceived risk associated with illegal behaviours at level-
crossings. 
 
Jeremy Davey1, Angela Wallace1, Nick Stenson1 and James Freeman1  
  
1 Centre for Accident Research & Road Safety – Queensland (CARRS-Q) / Queensland 









Problem.  Accidents between motorists and trains at road/rail level crossings represent a 
significant portion of Australia’s rail toll.  This study represents an attempt at articulating the 
understanding of the specific motorist behaviours that are most instrumental in contributing to 
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such accidents.  Method.  Forty-seven (47) train drivers, including representatives from both 
regional and metropolitan settings, were provided a list of commonly observed illegal 
motorist behaviours, developed in consultation with an expert panel, and were asked to rate 
each of them on a Likert-scale from 1 to 5, from lowest risk to highest risk.  Results.  In 
general, the highest rated behaviours for risk reflected wilful violations by motorists, with 
negligent lapse-style behaviours rated close behind.  Discussion.  Differences between the 
ratings of the urban and regional sample are highlighted, and implications for the use of the 
findings toward improved level crossing safety are discussed. 
 




1.  Introduction 
 
Across the Australian rail network, there are approximately 9400 level-crossings, in 
which roads and railway tracks intersect.  Statistics from the Australian Transport Safety 
Bureau indicate that, in the period between 1997 and 2002, there were 74 deaths attributed to 
collisions between trains and motor vehicles at Australian level-crossings.  Though 
representing less than 1% of the national road toll in the same period, these deaths constitute a 
significant proportion of the Australian rail toll.  Beyond the cost in human terms, it is also 
the potential for damage and loss inherent in road/rail collisions that mark them as an area of 
concern, with the potential losses from major events such as derailments including not only 
property damage, but also potential costs from delayed freight lines, litigation and increased 
insurance premiums.  With such potential losses at stake, the focus turns toward 
understanding what causes such accidents.1,2 
Traditionally, engineering-related perspectives have provided the bulk of the insight 
into level-crossing accident prevention.  A hallmark of this approach has been to present 
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engineering solutions, such as boom gates, as the solution of choice in preventing level-
crossing accidents.  There may be some truth to the inadequacy of protection at Australian 
level-crossings; at present, less than 30% are equipped with active protection systems or 
physical barriers, with the remainder adorned only with passive protective meashures, such as 
stop and give-way signs.  However, this approach may have reached the limits of its 
usefulness.  Such an approach dismisses the role of human behaviour as a factor in level-
crossing accidents, suggesting that external physical controls are the only way to prevent 
accidents.  Furthermore, statistics indicate that active protections are far from infallible in this 
regard, demonstrating they are in place where 60% of the fatalities are recorded.  Regardless, 
the Australian National Road Safety Action Plan has pronounced the cost of upgrading all 
crossings to active systems as prohibitive, meaning other avenues of preventing level-crossing 
accidents must be explored.1,3,4 
Recent directions in safety at level crossings are focusing efforts towards a human 
factors approach, examining motorist behaviour.  However, significant difficulties are faced 
in collecting data on risky behaviours; level-crossing accidents are a low base-rate 
occurrence, often happening in remote locations, and what near-miss data that is available is 
notoriously underreported and poorly detailed.  To circumvent these issues, research has 
begun to ask train drivers to self-report on the near-misses they observe at level-crossings.  
Results from one such study conducted in Australia found that the regularity at which ‘near-
misses’ occur each week was likely to be significantly higher than previous estimates 
assumed.  However, though the study also reported that train drivers perceive a general 
disregard for the laws and warning systems by motorists to underlie level-crossings accidents, 
it did not dig deeper to discover which specific motorist behaviours were most dangerous in 
this regard.5  
 
1.1. The Present Study 
The present study aims to build on the current understanding of high risk behaviours 
implicated in Australian level-crossing accidents.  In pursuing its objectives, it seeks to extend 
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previous research by tapping the knowledge and experiences of train drivers themselves.  This 
group has arguably the most practical exposure to and experience with the behaviours 
precipitating level-crossing accidents.  The research sought to capitalise on this knowledge by 
asking drivers to assess a number of commonly observed illegal motorist behaviours at level 
crossings and assign each a perceived level of risk.  Therefore, the research primarily aimed 
to identify drivers’ current perceptions regarding level of risk (e.g., subjective estimation) 
rather than determine the actual frequency of such occurrences (e.g., objective risk).   The 
output of this research can be conceptualised as the ‘ground-work’ information for the 
construction of educational interventions to promote level-crossing safety, providing a clear 





2.1.  Participants 
Participants were forty-seven train drivers working for a major rail operator in 
Queensland.  Twenty-two drivers were recruited from a regional area and twenty-five from an 
urban area.  No other demographic information was collected. 
 
2.2.  Measures 
The participants were provided a short survey, listing nineteen behaviours observed 
of motorists at level-crossings.  These survey items were drawn from past focus group 
research with train drivers, rail administrators and motorists, and were identified as 
representative of some of the more common and more dangerous motorist behaviours.  
Participants were asked to rate the level of risk they associated with each of the behaviours on 
a five point Likert-style scale, where 1 represented low risk and 5 represented high risk. 
 
2.3.  Procedures 
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Distribution of surveys was conducted through two intermediaries in the rail operator.  
Thirty surveys were sent to each of the regional and urban contacts for distribution among 
their drivers, who were then free to decide whether or not to participate.  At final count, this 
resulted in a 73% participation rate in the regional sample and an 83% rate in the urban 
sample.  This data was subject to statistical analysis to identify any pertinent themes. 
 
 
3.  Results 
 
3.1.  Aggregate Train Driver Perceived Risk Ratings 
As can be seen in Table 1 below, aggregate ratings of risk proscribed by the train 
drivers leaned toward the more dangerous end of the spectrum.  To this end, 10 of the 19 acts 
were regarded as belonging to the highest echelon of dangerous behaviours at level-crossings, 
polling an average risk rating of between 4.51 and 5.00.  Not surprisingly, at the head of this 
list was the act of trying to beat the train across the crossing, where the driver knowingly 
gambles on their ability to safely clear a crossing before an approaching train crosses.  
Perceived higher risk behaviours were also associated with crossing in poor visibility 
situations, crossing with haste (overtaking, bypassing boom gates, crossing in-front of a 
visible train), crossing without due attention (not looking for a second train, queuing, not 
noticing passive crossings) and not responding to warning devices (not stopping for passive 
crossings, driving through an activated active crossing).  It is noted that while many of these 
items constitute intentional behaviours, it is also possible that these acts may at times involve 
unintentional behaviours such as errors and lapses in judgement.   The possibility that 
crossing behaviours can either be intentional or unintentional should also be borne in mind 
when interpreting the following results.  
The next 7 behaviours were regarded by the drivers as high risk, and polled an 
average risk rating of between 4.50 and 3.51.  These behaviours again demonstrated the 
common ground of acts of haste or possibly negligence, but seemingly also implied a level of 
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safety consideration.  For example, included behaviours such as scanning on approach 
without stopping and crossing when the train is distant are obviously dangerous, but 
demonstrate at least some consideration of risk by the driver.  The two remaining behaviours, 
crossing before boom gates began to descend or had fully ascended, were regarded as 
presenting only moderate levels of risk.  This is likely because, though these behaviours are 
against the law and hold the potential for harm, they do show some deference to the active 
protections. 
[INSERT  TABLE  1] 
 
 
3.2.  Regional versus Urban Driver Perceived Risk Ratings 
Finally,  the perceived risk ratings were broken down into regional driver ratings and 
urban driver ratings in order to determine whether differences existed in perceptions of risk  at 
different locations (see Table 2).  ,  
 At first glance the ratings appear fairly consistent between the two groups.  The act 
of consciously trying to beat the train across the tracks again draws most severe ratings, and 
again the behaviours of crossing before boom gates begin to descend or have fully ascended 
again rate as the least dangerous.  Similar also is the risk ratings skew toward rating the 
behaviours as generally dangerous, and the distribution of numbers of behaviours between the 
highest, high and moderate risk groups.   
T-tests were conducted on the average risk ratings assigned to each group, which 
revealed only one marginally significant difference between the groups as urban drivers were 
more likely to perceive going through a crossing when the lights are flashing and the train is 
visible as a more risky behaviour compared to their rural counterparts [t(47) = -2.01, 
p=.05].  With the exception of crossing when the train is visible, there were few notable 
differences between the drivers as both groups were likely to perceive most of the listed 
crossing behaviours as dangerous.     
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4.  Discussion 
The aim of the present study was to build on current understanding of the high risk 
motorist behaviours implicated in Australian level-crossing accidents.  Capitalising on the 
knowledge and experiences of urban and regional train drivers, the study has been able to 
assemble a hierarchy of risk from a sample of commonly observed level-crossing behaviours.  
Rated as most dangerous was the act of trying to beat the train across the crossing, a 
behavioural description that implies conscious risk taking on the part of the motorist.  Similar 
themes were repeated among the other upper echelon of dangerous behaviours, specifically 
crossing with haste, crossing in poor visibility situations and ignoring warning devices.  These 
behaviours can possibly be categorised as violations on the part of the drivers, acts that imply 
a disregard of safe crossing protocols by the motorists, as well as a possible indifference 
toward the risks involved in their behaviours.  The remaining behaviours in this upper echelon 
of risk were indicative of negligent lapses, where drivers are crossing without due attention to 
the conditions in front of them.  While these behaviours do not involve deliberate violation on 
the part of the motorists, they remain deserving of examination as dangerous behaviours 
because they are indicative of a passive approach to risk assessment while driving.  Hence, at 
an aggregate level, it is apparent that train drivers consider motorists’ deliberate protocol 
violations and negligently lax approach to hazard detection as the predominant causes of 
danger at level-crossings.6,7 
Mirroring the aggregate level analysis, the assigned risk levels show remarkable 
consistency between the urban and regional groups.  With only one exception, each of the 
level-crossing behaviours retain the same risk categorisation.  Where discrepancies are 
observed, they appear on the surface to be mostly minor differences in the rank order which 
the items appear.  This is notable in that it indicates that the both sets of drivers, presumably 
drawing on their own experiences of either urban or regional locales, still share a similar view 




the urban and regional ratings, closer investigation indicates there is still some meaningful 
disagreement on the risk levels involved in certain behaviours. 
Where significant differences were observed between urban and regional drivers’ risk 
ratings, they are open to interpretation.  Notable, however, is that in all bar one case, the 
urban drivers demonstrate a tendency to rate risk levels higher than their regional candidates.  
Given that several of the behaviours in question relate to active crossing features (such as 
flashing lights and boom gates), the most ready explanation is that urban drivers are more 
familiar with active crossings.  Hence, they are more likely to have firsthand experience of 
accidents and near misses caused by inappropriate driver behaviours at these sites and, 
therefore, recognise them as more dangerous.  An alternative explanation of the differences in 
risk ratings may be that regional train drivers are subject to the same learning effects observed 
in regional motorists.  If this was the case, it would follow that, due to lower exposure to 
hazardous incidents (and indeed traffic in general), regional train drivers may gradually come 
to be conditioned to discount the possibility of accidents at level-crossing accidents, learning 
which is fortified with incident-free experience. 
 
4.1.  Impact on Industry 
This study has taken steps toward refining the assessment of behavioural risk factors 
at level-crossings.  It has drawn upon train drivers as first-hand witnesses of level-crossing 
‘near miss’ incidents to identify and categorise driver behaviours according to potential for 
danger.  In assembling such a framework, it can be seen to provide the groundwork for the 
construction of level-crossing safety interventions, supplying a clear guide for which 
behaviours need to be specifically targeted.  Furthermore, given that the ratings provided by 
urban and regional train drivers align so closely, it appears that the content on which such 
programs focus may be applicable to both locales.  Thus, rather than concentrating on 
searching for meaningful differences between the behaviour and motivations of urban and 
regional motorists at level-crossings, these results indicate that future campaigns should focus 
on presenting core standardised content.  Perhaps, rather than seeking to compartmentalise 
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level-crossing safety content according to group, more progress may be made by focusing on 
these common behaviours.    
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Table 1.     Level of Train Driver-Proscribed Risk Associated with Various Level-Crossing 
Behaviours. 
Behaviour  Mean Standard Deviation 
Try to beat the train across the crossing  4.91 0.28 
Driving around the boom gates  4.81 0.68 
Drive in front of train when it is 'close' to the crossing  4.77 0.52 
Going thru the crossing as soon as one train has 
passed  4.74 0.57 
Queuing up over a congested crossing  4.72 0.71 
Not looking at passive crossings  4.68 0.51 
Go thru flashing lights (at crossings with flashing lights 
only) when train visible  4.64 0.60 
Going across the crossing when unable to see if there 
is a train coming (poor visibility)  4.62 0.61 
Not stopping at all at passive crossings  4.57 0.54 
Overtaking cars that are stopped at the crossing  4.55 0.97 
Following the car in front across the crossing without 
looking  4.43 0.71 
Trying to get through the crossing before the boom 
gates come down (moving)  4.30 0.93 
Speeding on approach to crossings  4.21 0.83 
Going through flashing lights  4.11 0.73 
Going at passive crossings when the train is visible but 
'far away'  3.79 0.88 
Looking or scanning on approach and then not 
stopping or slowing if no train seen  3.68 0.86 
Slowing and rolling thru STOP signed crossings  3.62 1.09 
Going thru flashing lights before boom gates start to go 
down  3.43 1.35 
Going thru flashing lights before boom gates start to 






























Table 2. Levels of Risk Associated with Level-
Crossing Behaviours     Rural Drivers 
 
Urban Drivers 







Try to beat the train across the crossing 4.86 0.35 4.96 0.20 
Going thru the crossing as soon as one train has 
passed 4.77 0.43 4.92 0.28 
Driving around the boom gates 4.68 0.94 4.84 0.37 
Drive in front of train when it is 'close' to the 
crossing 4.68 0.65 4.80 0.50 
Going across the crossing when unable to see if 
there is a train coming (poor visibility) 4.64 0.66 4.80 0.41 
Queuing up over a congested crossing 4.64 0.95 4.80 0.41 
Following the car in front across the crossing 
without looking 4.59 0.67 4.72 0.68 
Not looking at passive crossings 4.55 0.60 4.64 0.49 
Not stopping at all at passive crossings 4.50 0.60 4.64 0.76 
Trying to get through the crossing before the boom 
gates come down (moving) 4.50 1.01 4.60 0.58 
Go thru flashing lights (at crossings with flashing 
lights only) when train visible* 4.45 0.67 4.28 0.73 
Overtaking cars that are stopped at the crossing 4.45 1.18 4.16 0.69 
Speeding on approach to crossings 4.32 0.78 4.12 0.88 
Going through flashing lights 4.05 0.78 4.12 0.83 
Looking or scanning on approach and then not 
stopping or slowing if no train seen 3.73 0.88 3.84 0.90 
Going at passive crossings when the train is visible 
but 'far away' 3.73 0.88 3.64 1.04 
Slowing and rolling thru STOP signed crossings 3.59 1.18 3.64 0.86 
Going thru flashing lights before boom gates start to 
go down 3.50 1.14 3.36 1.52 
Going thru flashing lights before boom gates start to 
come up 3.05 1.25 2.68 1.34 
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